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1.  Background and Introduction  
Current pricing instruments for urban transport often result in on-going financial deficits and/or 
generate insufficient capital funds to finance, what are sometimes major, investment needs.  The 
traditional, and in many places the prevailing, means of financing these on-going deficits and 
investment needs is through public budgets.  However, this  is increasingly subject to criticism as 
other sectors of public concern place competing demands on public budgets.  These criticisms 
have created a pressure to identify alternative means of generating project finance, both to cover 
capital investment needs and to cover current costs, including the costs of servicing the capital.  
Whilst capital may be provided by either the public or the private sector, private finance is not in 
general an option for covering current costs.  For this the options are user charges, public 
budgets, value capture and cross subsidy.  This immediately illustrates the importance of looking 
at funding packages rather than individual instruments, as private finance always needs to be 
associated with other sources of funding to service the capital. 
 
Private finance is often advocated as a way of relieving pressure on public budgets and increasing 
available funding, as well as introducing private sector enterprise and incentives for efficiency.  
But there is a conflict between private profitability and allocative efficiency, not only because 
unprofitable projects may be socially worthwhile or vice versa but also because members of 
private consortia may stand to gain for instance for overspecifying (or ‘gold-plating’) the project.  
Key factors are the extent of competition and the sharing of risk. 
 
Two broad approaches to the introduction of private capital into urban public transport may be 
identified, each with its problems.  Outright privatisation will lead to key decisions being taken 
on a commercial rather than a social basis. Therefore some form of public-private partnership, in 
which the public authority specifies the outputs and invites bids from the private sector to 
provide it, for instance under a franchising arrangement, looks the most promising approach. 
Within this approach a complicated range of options is available.  A third approach which has 
been successful in a limited number of cases is that of value capture.  This may be viewed as a 
form of public private partnership whereby the public sector seeks contributions to the costs of 
transport financing from the private sector in recognition of the benefits that the private sector 
receive from transport.  These contributions may be voluntary, where a developer wishes to 
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ensure or accelerate the implementation of a particular project, or compulsory.    
  
A key factor in the introduction of private capital into public transport is the sharing of risks. 
Commercial profit is dependent on the investment time, interest rates and risk management.  
Because of the long time periods involved, these risks may be very high. In fact, Banister (1995) 
believes that, generally, investment in transport infrastructure is seen as having a higher risk than 
investment in other types of projects and, therefore, risk and the way it is shared, is a major issue 
in involving private financing for transport infrastructure investments (Banister, 1995). The 
following main classes of risk may be distinguished (McKay, 1989, in Rienstra and Nijkamp, 
1997): 
 
• political risks - for example, changes in transport policy  by the government; 
• financial risks - for example, fluctuations in interest rates or in exchange rates etc; 
• construction risks; for example, delays, unexpected and higher costs etc.; 
• operational risks; for example, damage by accidents, vandalism etc.; 
• commercial risks; for example, wrong cost estimates, wrong estimates of the traffic 
volume, unexpected competition, etc. 
 
In an outright privatisation most of these risks will be borne by the private sector. However, it is 
generally accepted that one of the strengths of public private partnerships is that each risk can be 
borne by the party most able to control it. That means that political risks, and some commercial 
risks (for instance the influence on traffic levels of government policies) are best retained by the 
government, whilst other risks (e.g. construction costs  or operational risks) are best borne by the 
private sector. 
 
In what follows we review briefly the alternatives of outright privatisation and of public private 
partnerships. We then discuss four examples of public private partnerships from the rapidly 
growing British experience in this field before drawing our conclusions. 
 
2. Outright Privatisation 
Where transport infrastructure or operations are totally privatised then it is generally expected 
that the private sector will fund new investment (Marler et al, 1998). The private sector may 
directly finance a new infrastructure investment, as happens with many rail projects, with the 
user of the infrastructure repaying the loan over its life. Alternatively, the private sector may be 
responsible for both infrastructure and operation, as is the case in the UK aviation industry, with 
the private sector operator obtaining its revenue directly from the user – this might be termed 
‘pure privatisation’,. 
 
In both cases, the emphasis will be placed on obtaining a financial return through revenues from 
user charges.  This will mean that financially viable projects, which do not  take wider social 
policies into account, will take priority over economically viable projects which do, and that, 
where projects are not otherwise financially viable, prices will be set above the optimum.  This 
could distort, perhaps significantly, the performance of any overall strategy. For example, higher 
fares designed to produce a return on investment in a new urban rail system may reduce 
patronage and hence the contribution to congestion relief and environmental protection.  
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The attraction of this approach lies in its apportionment of all risks and financing obligations to 
the private sector. However, before it becomes involved in such an approach the private sector 
would require a considerable degree of freedom from government and regulatory constraints, 
something which few governments are prepared to consent to in anything but a limited number of 
cases. Consequently, this approach is, particularly in urban areas, the least common.   
 
The results of the strategic modelling of urban transport policy packages in nine European cities 
in the project FATIMA (FATIMA, 1999), clearly indicated that the greatest benefits occurred 
under funding regimes (public or private) in which government retained control over policy on 
pricing and service levels. This may be associated with continuing public sector subsidies, which 
may be financed from general taxation or via ear-marked taxes (such as road pricing), value 
capture or cross-subsidy. 
 
3. Public-private partnerships 
Much more common than pure privatisation is for public-private partnerships (PPPs) to be 
formed between governments and private sector organisations.  This places government in the 
role of ‘facilitator’, provides a mechanism for it to make financial contributions in recognition of 
non-financial benefits and enables a sharing of risks and responsibilities between public and 
private sectors.  According to Miles (1996), public/private partnerships in general have the 
potential for creating synergy between the public service culture and the entrepreneurial 
approach. He specifies five desirable features for a successful public/private partnership.  These 
features are:  
 
• a joint interest in delivering an effective service; 
• a co-operative effort, with clear division of responsibility; 
• shared cost and revenue relationships, with more flexibility than if the public sector 
operates alone; 
• private sector interest in the well-being of the customer and quality of service; 
• public sector concern for the wider public interest, especially the well-being of non-users. 
 
Two broad categories of PPP may be defined, as follows: 
 
• Start-up agreements - whereby public funds are made available to assist with ‘start-up’ 
costs over, for example, the first three years of a project, after which time the private 
operator must sustain the project into the future; 
 
• Franchising - whereby, in general, government awards private companies or consortia 
rights, on the basis of a competitive bidding process, to operate services in a predefined 
area or corridor, usually without fear of competition and for a sufficiently long period for 
investment to be recuperated and a profit made.  
 
Under a conventional franchise contract, the franchisee pays the franchisor for use of his property 
rights, generally through the means of a competitive tendering process. In the case of transport 
where infrastructure is often operated at a deficit, this situation may be reversed: the transport 
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authority (franchisor)compensates the private company (franchisee). Broadly, there are two 
different kinds of contracts: a given transport system is transferred to the company which offers 
to operate it at the lowest costs or the contract is transferred to the company which offers the best 
transport system for a given budget. Clearly, such systems need detailed agreement on service 
levels and operating conditions, in order to meet both efficiency and equity criteria and other 
transport objectives (Rienstra and Nijkamp, 1997). 
 
Midgley (1994) identifies the following different forms of franchise contract: 
 
• BOT: Build-Operate-Transfer (the usual approach: facility paid for by the investor but is 
owned by the concessionaire; the investor maintains and operates the facility during the 
concession period) with the following variants 
• BOO: Build-Own-Operate: Investor retains ownership, operates in perpetuity via an open-
ended franchise 
• DBOT: Design-Build-Operate-Transfer: as BOT, with design 
• BOOS: Build-Own-Operate-Sell: at the end of the franchise period the state pays a 
residual value 
• BOOT: Build-Own-Operate-Transfer: as BOOS, without terminal payment 
• BOTT: Build-Operate-Training-Transfer: investor is required to provide training before 
the facility is transferred (mainly for developing countries) 
• DBFO (design, build, finance and operate) may be viewed as a special case of DBOT.   
 
In addition, there are also cases of ‘non-build’ franchises, e.g. in the case of bus services in 
London, of rail services throughout Great Britain and of public transport operations in many 
French cities whereby the franchisee is required to operate and maintain only. 
 
British Experience 
Background 
Since the early 1980s, all major British urban public transport investments have been required to 
have a substantial private sector component. There is therefore extensive British experience to 
draw on. In what follows we discuss four projects that are either completed or underway. 
 
 
Manchester Metrolink 
Metrolink is the name of the light rail system in Manchester. It was opened in 1992 and is widely 
recognised as being a successful project, not only in terms of its patronage and performance but 
also as an example in public private partnership. The private sector has borne a share of the risk 
and has met part of the financial cost of the project. Manchester Metrolink was the first major 
case in Britain of an urban public transport project with private sector participation.  
 
Metrolink was initially devised by the local public transport authority in the early 1980s on the 
assumption that it would be built, financed and operated by the public sector. However, in the 
course of the local public transport authority putting together their case for matched central 
government funding, central government raised the issue of private sector involvement. The 
result was that the application for matched central government funding was approved on the basis 
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that private sector involvement in the project would be sought. 
 
A number of options for involving the private sector were considered. However, this was not 
straight forward as urban rail services, including light rail services, tend to be loss-making in 
financial terms. Initially, the local public transport authority’s favoured approach was that of 
separating the infrastructure from the operations, keeping the track, stations and signalling within 
the public sector and charging a private sector operator, who would own the rolling stock, for the 
right to operate services. The loss-making nature of the system, however, meant that this 
arrangement would have meant a commitment to on-going annual subsidy which was a great 
concern to central government. The prevailing  mechanism was that of Design, Build, Operate 
and Maintain (DBOM), the principal features of which are threefold. Firstly, a single contract to 
design and build the system and then to operate and maintain it for a fixed number of years (15 in 
the case of Metrolink) is let. Secondly, the contractor pays the public transport authority for the 
right to operate services for that fixed period through entering into a concession agreement. 
Thirdly, following these two financial transactions the private sector contractor bears the 
commercial risks of operation over the life of the concession agreement. Together, these three 
features mean that: 
 
• longer term operating and maintenance issues are properly considered at the ‘design/build 
stage 
• the private sector, through the concession agreement, makes a payment which goes to 
partly offset the construction costs 
• the public sector’s financial outlays are all at the outset of the project, meaning that there 
is no on-going commitment to subsidy and commercial risk is transferred to the private 
sector. This is often thought to promote efficiency. 
 
A key factor in the success or otherwise of Metrolink (and many other public-private 
partnerships) was the terms of the operating concession. This document is the means by which 
the public transport authority exerts its legally enforceable influence over the operation of 
Metrolink by a private sector operator. As such, it is also a key determinant of the level of private 
sector interest and hence competition for the franchise. The Metrolink operating concession seeks 
to balance public sector policy objectives with private sector commercial objectives by: 
 
• specifying minimum levels of service, in terms of frequency, periods of operation and 
vehicle capacity 
• including penalty clauses for failure to run 98% of scheduled vehicle km or for early 
termination of the agreement 
• allowing the operator to apply to run more or less than the minimum levels of service 
• giving the operator freedom to set fare levels (subject to commercial pressures resulting 
from bus competition along the route). 
 
Tyson (1997) reports that “there was considerable interest at the pre-qualification stage and 
effective competition in the two stages of the bidding”. The winning consortium comprised GEC-
Alsthom, Mowlem, AMEC and GM buses.  However, the payment for the operating concession, 
ie the private sector financing contribution, was only £5m, a small proportion of the £140m total 
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system cost. 
 
Very soon after the opening of the first phase of Metrolink in 1992, further phases were being 
proposed. The first of these to be developed was a proposal to extend  the system to Eccles and 
Salford Quays. This project gave the public transport authority the opportunity to open a new 
round of bidding for a similar DBOM style contract to design and build the extension and then to 
operate the whole Metrolink system. Though the incumbent operating consortium bid, a new 
consortium, Altram - comprising John Laing, Serco and Ansaldo Trasporti - won the contract. 
Many of the characteristics of the resulting operating concession were similar to that for phase 1. 
However, the striking difference is that the payment for the operating concession was, this time, 
£90m compared with a new construction cost of just over £100m (though project management 
and other costs amount to a further £40m). In addition to this, £13m private sector developer 
contributions were secured in the form of cash or land transfers. This second round of bidding 
has, therefore, proven extremely useful in terms of levering in further private sector financing. 
Bidding is now underway for a third franchise involving substantial further extensions of the 
system. 
 
Whilst Manchester Metrolink has proven that it is possible to involve the private sector in 
financing and risk-management of urban public transport schemes, care should be taken when 
drawing conclusions for other potential schemes. “The key factor in determining the extent of 
private ssector interest and funding is the commercial performance of the system” (Tyson, 1997). 
Manchester metrolink performs well in this respect and the second round of bidding was able to 
benefit from the track record (however brief) established by the first phase of the system. Many 
urban public transport operations do not perform so well. 
 
 
East Leeds Quality Bus corridor 
Leeds City Council have, since the early 1990s, had proposals for a quality bus corridor along the 
A64, a radial corridor to the east of the City. Following the publication in 1998 by First Group 
Plc, one of the largest private sector bus operators in the UK, of their ‘Twin-track approach’, the 
scheme has been the subject of considerable attention. 
 
First Group’s Twin-Track approach is a statement of their willingness to provide funding for 
infrastructure improvement projects in partnership with funding from other, public sector, 
sources. In the light of this, Leeds City Council and First Group, along with another major private 
sector bus operator, Arriva, entered into negotiations over the East Leeds quality bus corridor. 
The emerging scheme involves a guided busway, major upgrading of bus stops along the route 
and a host of general quality improvements along the corridor, at an approximate total cost of 
£10m. In addition, new guided buses will operate along the route. FirstGroup and Arriva together 
have made a commitment to providing up to half of the total infrastructure costs, in addition to 
providing the new vehicles which will operate the route. On the basis of this commitment, central 
government has committed £5m over two years to the project. 
 
Whilst the agreement would be with First Group and Arriva, it is not possible to restrict use of 
the upgraded facilities to these two operators. There will be ‘open access’ from other potential 
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entrants to the corridor as the local highway authority do not have the powers to restrict access to 
the public highway. The only limitation will be that use of the guideway may only be made by 
vehicles which conform to the Construction and Use Regulations defining a guided bus. This 
‘free rider’ issue has been a concern to all those involved in the negotiations. There is a 
possibility that there may be potential to require a payment of some description from additional 
operators who use the corridor but this is, as yet, unclear. 
 
Construction is now underway and the East Leeds Quality bus corridor will represent the first 
significant example, certainly in the UK at least, of private sector bus operators providing 
financing for a bus infrastructure project. 
 
Leeds Supertram - Contributions from new developments 
The Leeds Supertram is a light rail scheme connecting the centre of Leeds to a number of 
business and residential locations along three corridors to the south, north west and east of the 
city of Leeds and with a substantial park and ride facility adjacent to the strategic motorway 
network. The first route (that to the south) gained planning approval in the early 1990s but was 
unsuccessful in securing the approximately £130m funding required. Central government  made 
it clear that the project was more likely to receive central government funding if there is also a 
significant (though unspecified) contribution from the private sector. Partly in response to this, 
Leeds City council, in collaboration with Metro, the local public transport authority, has pursued 
a number of methods of securing this private sector involvement. One of those methods is 
through the planning approval process. 
 
When developers seek planning approval for new developments on or adjacent to the  Leeds 
Supertram corridor negotiations are entered into for their financial assistance towards the 
Supertram, or a substitute public transport, scheme. The results of these negotiations are 
incorporated in a Section 106 agreement; this is a contract detailing the conditions of the 
planning approval. If a planning application is accepted in outline, subject to a number of 
conditions, these conditions are then formally stated within the section 106 agreement. The 
planning authority is then able to grant its approval to the application. The Section 106 agreement 
is a legally binding document, in general, taking affect as of the completion or opening of the 
new development. 
 
At the time of preparing the case study  approximately £2m had been promised in this way, about 
£0.3m of which had materialised. The hope of Leeds City council was that this could be 
approximately doubled over the next year or so. In terms of the overall scheme cost of south 
Leeds Supertram (£130m) this clearly represents a fairly insignificant funding source. 
 
This approach of securing developer contributions is set out in a guide, published by Leeds city 
council.  The approach is relatively unusual and at first, it was viewed as akin to selling planning 
applications.  However, more recently it has gained greater acceptance and was upheld in an 
inquiry by the planning inspectorate. 
 
With the passing of the 1999 Transport Act, a much more significant method of funding came 
into the picture, with the legalisation of the introduction of urban road pricing on the basis that 
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the local authority should retain the revenue for reinvestment in the urban transport sector. This 
would provide a substantial future revenue stream with which to service private investment in 
supertram, and accordingly Leeds City Council developed proposals which initially would be 
based on a simple cordon around the city centre. More sophisticated forms of road pricing might 
follow. However, with the announcement of the 10 year transport plan in 2001 it became 
apparent that much more substantial public sector funding for urban public transport would be 
available, including sufficient funding for the Leeds supertram to go ahead without the income 
from road pricing. Accordingly interest in road pricing in Leeds has declined, with the City 
Council now saying it wishes to see supertram running to provide a high quality alternative to the 
car before road pricing is introduced. 
 
London Docklands developer contributions 
Throughout the 1980s the Docklands area of east London, just north of the river Thames, was 
subject to substantial redevelopment for both commercial and residential purposes.  New 
transport infrastructure was viewed as a key factor in both supporting and driving this 
redevelopment and, consequently, there has been substantial investment in public transport in 
Docklands over the past 15 years. 
 
The first stage of this was the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) which gained approval in the 
early 1980s, began construction in 1984 and was opened (to time and budget) in 1987. At a cost 
of approximately £70m, the original DLR was a low cost railway project whose funding came 
from central government (50% from Department of environment on development grounds and 
50% from Department of Transport on transport grounds). 
 
In 1985, with construction of the DLR underway, a massive £4bn high quality development was 
proposed for Docklands at Canary Wharf. The 30 HA site, with a potential working population of 
over 50,000, constituted the biggest commercial development in Europe. As such, it took 
everyone somewhat by surprise. 
 
It soon became clear, even before construction of the DLR was complete, that the system would 
be insufficient for the scale of demand associated with Canary Wharf and other secondary 
developments. Original designs for the DLR catered for a forecast patronage of 25,000 
passengers per year but subsequent to the Canary Wharf proposals forecasts escalated to up to 
65,000 passengers per year. In addition, the developers were unhappy with the poor connections 
to the financial centre of London offered by the DLR. Therefore, a programme of works was 
identified, at a cost of £276m, to expand the DLR’s capacity fourfold and to extend the system to 
Bank, providing links into the London Underground and to the financial centre of the City. 
 
With development driving the planning of the system expansion, significant developer 
contributions of approximately £100m were secured from the developers of Canary Wharf. In 
addition, the speed at which the transport development took place, at least in part due to the 
developer’s involvement, was also remarkable; from the conception of the expansion project in 
1985, the ‘City Extension’ to the DLR was planned, funded, authorised, constructed and opened 
by 1991. 
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However, further attempts to involve the private sector in the expansion of the public transport 
network in the Docklands area have been less successful. Firstly, the ‘Beckton Extension’ to the 
DLR was designed to improve access to the Royal docks area of Docklands and to provide 
connections with the North London heavy rail line. At a cost of £280m, “the idea was for the 
extension to be funded from the future sales of land, enhanced by the additional value the railway 
itself would create, and managed through an independent land holding company” (Willis, 1997). 
Land prices had risen substantially in the area around the original DLR since its opening and the 
same process as anticipated in the area around the Royal Docks. However, soon after the letting 
of the contract in 1989 the property market collapsed and, with it, the proposed funding 
mechanism. Central government, through the Department of the Environment, was left to pick up 
the bill for the project. 
 
The most recent development in the area is the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) project.  This is a 
large scale project extending the London Underground into and through the Docklands area, 
providing connections with the West End, with the rest of the underground network, with the 
mainline stations at Waterloo, London Bridge and Stratford, with the Docklands Light Railway 
and with bus services at 7 key stations and with a park and ride interchange at the North 
Greenwich station. 
 
Though the initial ideas for the JLE were proposed in the mid 1970s, “until the late 1980s 
development boom and the impetus given to the area by the initial investment in the Docklands 
Light Railway, the prospect of an underground line being built in Docklands was remote” 
(Willis, 1997). Fears from the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) about the 
capacity of even the expanded Docklands Light Railway to cope with the rapidly increasing 
working population in the area and growing pressure from developers themselves, fearful for the 
success of their investments, pushed the project up the agenda. 
 
Negotiations, involving the Canary Wharf Developers, London Underground and the Department 
of Transport, resulted in a £1.7bn JLE project being given the go ahead in the early 1990s. Of this 
cost, Olympia and York were to contribute £400m. Two options for its route west of Docklands 
were considered and thanks to both strong planning and developer pressures, the option via 
Waterloo was adopted. However, when the first £40m instalment of the £400m developer 
contribution became due in 1992 Olympia and York were unable to pay and weeks later went 
into administration. Their interests were taken over by Canary Wharf Ltd, a consortium of 11 
banks. The JLE was then halted whilst the government sought the funding from alternative 
sources. In late 1993, having emerged from administration, Canary Wharf Ltd contributed £98m 
immediately with a further £300m phased over 25 years from opening of the JLE. In real terms, 
however, this £300m equated to just £180m net present value so the level of private sector 
contribution was diminished. Furthermore, penalty clauses had always been attached to the 
developer contributions such that these contributions would be reduced in the event of the JLE 
opening behind schedule, which it will. Meanwhile, the most recent estimate of the total outturn 
costs of the JLE has increased to £2.9bn. Therefore, developers have been able to exert influence 
over the planning of a major transport scheme on the basis of their making a significant 
contribution to the overall costs of the project. These contributions have, however, been 
successively diminished over the construction phase of the project whilst the overall project costs 
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have escalated. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Private finance may be used to finance urban public transport schemes in a variety of ways. It is 
clear that there is a strong incentive to develop private finance as a way of supplementing 
government budgets and of increasing the efficiency with which the transport system is provided,  
but they also demonstrate some problems: 
 
• outright privatisation will lead to key decisions being taken on the basis of commercial 
rather than social considerations. Governments who wish to maintain a degree of control 
over the transport system and to use it to pursue transport policy objectives have therefore 
tended to favour public-private partnerships of one form or another 
 
• the private sector will only invest in transport infrastructure or operations if there is 
sufficient return to reward them for any risks involved. This may make this form of 
finance relatively expensive; alternatively it may lead the authority to reduce their degree 
of risk by granting them extensive monopoly powers. This is less worrying if the 
franchise is awarded by means of competitive bidding, as the discipline of this process 
should force the operator to act efficiently, and the franchise terms may restrict the 
potential use of monopoly power by controlling the fares and/or services to be provided 
 
It is generally recommended that the franchising approach is the best way of obtaining private 
sector capital for transport projects without the public sector losing control; within this broad 
approach it has however been seen that a complicated set of options exists. 
 
The combination of franchising and the pursuit of social objectives will generally mean that 
finance from sources other than user charges will be needed either to contribute towards 
providing the capital for investment or for servicing private capital (or both). A popular approach 
has been to seek to rely heavily on, developer contributions supplementing the private capital. 
However, in the cases we have examined only in the London Docklands, where improved public 
transport was crucial to the major scheme of a single developer, was a substantial developer 
contribution forthcoming (and even in that case the developer in question suffered severe 
financial problems). Elsewhere, whilst considerable success was achieved in attracting private 
capital into urban public transport investment, a continued public sector contribution was needed. 
 
This public sector contribution will be made much easier in future if road pricing is introduced to 
provide cross subsidy from road users. There is evidence that such cross subsidy is both 
economically efficient and politically acceptable. Following the passing of the 1999 Transport 
Act it appeared that a number of cities were interested in such a package in order to finance 
public transport schemes they had long planned but been unable to fund. However, with the 10 
year plan making much greater public sector funding available, interest in this package has 
waned.      
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